Multiple carbon accounting to support just and effective climate policies

Negotiating reductions in greenhouse gas emission involves the allocation of emissions and of emission reductions to specific agents, and notably, within the current UN framework, to associated countries. As production takes place in supply chains,increasingly extending over several countries, there are various options available in which emissions originating from one and the same activity may be attributed to different agents along the supply chain and thus to different countries. In this way, several distinct types of national carbon accounts can be constructed. We argue that these accounts will typically differ in the information they provide to individual countries on the effects their actions have on global emissions; and they may also, to varying degrees, prove useful in supporting the pursuit of an effective and just climate policy. None of the accounting systems, however, prove 'best' in achieving these aims under real-world circumstances; we thus suggest compiling reliable data to aid in the consistent calculation of multiple carbon accounts on a global level

Iterated elimination procedures

We study the existence and uniqueness (i.e.,order independence) of any arbitrary form of iterated elimination procedures in an abstract environment. By allowing for a transfinite elimination, we show a general existence of the iterated elimination procedure. Inspired by the seminal work of Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel (1990), we identify a fairly weak suffcient condition of Monotonicity* for the order independence of iterated elimination procedure. Monotonicity* requires a monotonicity property along any elimination path. Our approach is applicable to different forms of iterated elimination procedures used in (in)finite games, for example, iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies, rationalizability, and soon. We introduce a notion of CD* games, which incorporates Jackson's (1992) idea of "boundedness", and show the iterated elimination procedure is order independent in the class of CD* games. In finite games, we also formulate and show an "outcome" order-independence result suitable for Marx and Swinkels's (1997) notion of nice weak dominance